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Will Youngstown Survive?
Dr. Maeva Marcus*
With the advent of terrorism and the need for the United States
government to respond to its threat, the precedent of Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer' hovers temptingly in legal minds.
But to what end? As I listened to my fellow panelists discuss the
Steel Seizure case and thought about how it had been used by the
courts since it was decided, I was struck, with even greater force
than when I had written my book,2 by the mixed message sent by
Youngstown. If one were to read only Justice Black's opinion for
the court, the doctrinal significance of the decision would be clear:
under the Constitution's division of powers, the executive cannot
exercise legislative power; only Congress could authorize seizing
the steel mills to prevent a labor dispute from stopping produc-
tion. According to Black, the separation of powers is fixed and
exact. Dire emergencies, presumably, would not alter his consti-
tutional scheme.3 The concurring opinions of four other members
of the majority-the vote was 6-3 against the seizure-
immediately undercut the force of this holding, however. If the
three dissenters are added to these four, seven justices envisioned
occasions when the president might use inherent power. One is
left with the conclusion that the importance of Youngstown lies in
the Supreme Court's act of adjudicating the constitutional issues
presented by the steel seizure and ruling against a coordinate
branch of government rather than in the substance of the decision.
After 1952, the Supreme Court showed a much greater willing-
ness to grapple with constitutional problems. The political ques-
tion doctrine lost favor as a way to duck issues the Court did not
wish to face.4 New personnel undoubtedly contributed to the
* Dr. Maeva Marcus, Supreme Court historian, is author of the definitive account of
the Steel Seizure Case, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE: THE LIMITS OF PRESI-
DENTIAL POWER (1994).
1. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
2. Maeva Marcus, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE; THE LIMITS OF
PRESIDENTIAL POWER (1977; reprint ed., Durham, N.C.: 1994).
3. 343 U.S. 579, 582-89.
4. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) and Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969)
exemplify the Court's altered position. In challenges to the Vietnam War, however, the
Court failed to apply its more liberal conception of political questions. The Court turned
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Court's more activist stance, but the justices relied on Youngstown
for the legal precedent necessary to support their change in atti-
tude. The Court did not wholly abandon its traditional reluctance
to decide constitutional questions; the justices simply overcame it
more often.' But when the Court did decide separation-of-powers
issues, its application of the substantive ruling in the Steel Sei-
zure case was uneven. Two cases involving a citizen's right to a
passport illustrate the Court's difficulty in interpreting its holding
in Youngstown consistently. In Kent v. Dulles,' Justice William 0.
Douglas held for the Court that the secretary of state could not
deny Kent a passport for a reason not established by Congress; the
secretary was limited to the two grounds-lack of citizenship or
criminal or unlawful conduct-that Congress had authorized for
denial.7 The Court retreated from that strict adherence to separa-
tion of powers, however, in Zemel v. Rusk,' where the Court vali-
dated travel restrictions to Cuba imposed by the secretary of state
but not by Congress. Justice Black dissented, noting that all legis-
lative power was lodged in Congress and rejected the govern-
ment's argument that the president had inherent power to make
regulations regarding the issuance of passports. He observed that
the steel seizure precedent was exactly on point.9
Actions taken by President Richard Nixon, however, occasioned
the most dramatic use of Youngstown by the Supreme Court. In
the Pentagon Papers case," the Court refused to issue an injunc-
tion, sought by the Nixon administration, against the publication
of the papers, a history of American involvement in the Vietnam
War, surreptitiously copied by Daniel Ellsberg and given to the
New York Times to print. The government argued that publica-
tion should be enjoined on the ground that the president had in-
herent power to protect national security. For three of the justices
in the majority, the Steel Seizure case was determinative. Where
Congress had legislated in a certain field and had not authorized
the action requested by the government, namely, prior restraint of
publication, "It would ... be utterly inconsistent with the concept
away the many attempts to have the constitutionality of the war adjudicated. Massachu-
setts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1970) and DaCosta v. Laird, 405 U.S. 979 (1972) are among
the cases in which the Court denied certiorari.
5. See, for example, Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955).
6. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
7. Id. at 128.
8. 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
9. Id.at 20-21.
10. New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
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of separation of powers for this Court to use its power .. to pre-
vent behavior that Congress has specifically declined to prohibit.""
In another attempt by the Nixon administration to use inherent
power, this time to order wiretaps in internal security matters
without approval of a court, the Supreme Court similarly rejected
President Nixon's arguments. 12  Justice Lewis Powell, for the
Court, noted that the source of the president's power in such a
case had to be the Constitution, but Powell could find nothing in
the Fourth Amendment that authorized the executive branch to be
its own judge of when wiretapping was permissible. 3 Separation
of powers and the division of functions among the three branches
of government would best protect individual freedoms, Justice
Powell wrote. 4 The president's duty to ensure domestic security
would not be hindered, the Court asserted, by the requirements of
prior judicial review. 5
But it was in the litigation connected with the Watergate scan-
dal that Youngstown achieved its greatest prominence. In a series
of cases concerning the Watergate tapes, which were suspected of
containing evidence of presidential wrongdoing, Nixon sought to
escape the mandates of the courts by taking refuge in the separa-
tion-of-powers doctrine. Not only was the presidency an inde-
pendent branch of government with specific powers and duties, he
averred, but the president was also not subject to judicial review.
Nixon therefore took personal possession of the Watergate tapes to
keep them out of the hands of a grand jury investigating crimes
connected with the break-in at the headquarters of the Democratic
National Committee located in the Watergate office building.
When the president refused to turn the tapes over to the grand
jury, the special prosecutor subpoenaed him. John Sirica, chief
judge of the federal district court in the District of Columbia who
had handled all the criminal charges stemming from the Water-
gate burglary, ordered the president to show cause why he should
11. Id. at 742.
12. United States v. U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, 407 U.S.
297 (1972).
13. The protection of private speech from unreasonable surveillance had been brought
under Fourth Amendment safeguards by a series of cases. Id. at 313.
14. Id. at 317.
15. Id. at 318-21. The Youngstown precedent supported challenges to other Nixon
administration actions: the presidential impoundment of congressionally appropriated
funds and the dismantling of the Office of Economic Opportunity, which Congress had
voted to keep in business and to that end had appropriated funds. See Sioux Valley Empire
Electric Association, Inc. v. Butz, 367 F. Supp. 686 (1973) and Local 2677, the American
Federation of Government Employees v. Phillips, 358 F. Supp. 60 (1973).
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not be compelled to produce the tape recordings. The essence of
Nixon's response was his theory of separation of powers. If the
president were at the mercy of orders of a court, it "would effec-
tively destroy the status of the Executive Branch as an equal and
coordinate element of government." No instance could be found in
the whole history of federal courts which would "justify or permit
such a result." The president had absolute discretion to decide
whether the confidentiality of executive branch conversations was
more important than prosecuting a wrongdoer. And this decision
could not be reviewed by the courts, because they lacked any
means to force compliance by the president. Nixon was not above
the law, the brief stated, but he could be held accountable only by
impeachment, the method prescribed in the Constitution.
16
The president's claim that he was not amenable to court order
presented the Watergate Special Prosecution Force lawyers with a
ticklish problem. How could they get around the fact that in no
previous case had the president been cited personally? By chance,
I happened to be writing my dissertation on the steel seizure as
the Watergate scandal was unfolding and discussed with a friend
on the Special Prosecution Force the relevance of Youngstown.
Although the case was titled Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, every brief filed and every oral argument in every court it
came before talked about presidential power. No one mentioned
the power of the secretary of commerce to seize the steel mills. All
the Supreme Court opinions discuss the president s power to take
that action. Thus the argument could be made-and was in fact
made by the Watergate prosecutors-that courts had issued or-
ders directed in substance at the president, even if his name did
not appear in the title of the case."
Judge Sirica rejected Nixon's claims and issued an order enforc-
ing the subpoena. In his opinion, Sirica reviewed the reasons that
led him to decide that the court had authority to compel the presi-
dent's compliance with a grand jury subpoena. The Steel Seizure
case, Sirica wrote, effectively invalidated the proposition that the
president was not subject to the court's orders. To insist, after the
Youngstown ruling, that the president could not be reached by
court process, the judge observed, "would seem to exalt the form of
16. Brief in opposition, In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Misc. No. 47-73, U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia, pp. 3, 4, 7, 24, 29-30.
17. Memorandum in Support, In re Grand Jury Subpoena, pp. 25-26, n.11. Letter from
Phillip A. Lacovara to Maeva Marcus, August 13, 1973 (in the author's possession).
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the Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. case over its substance. Though
the court's order there went to the Secretary of Commerce, it was
the direct order of President Truman that was reversed."' 8 The
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit affirmed Judge Sirica's ruling. Using the same language as
Sirica, the court of appeals opinion noted that while it had been
the custom to address orders of the court to subordinate executive
branch officials:
To rule that this case [Nixon v. Sirica] turns on such a dis-
tinction would be to exalt the form of Youngstown Sheet &
Tube over its substance. Justice Black, writing for the
Youngstown majority, made it clear that the Court understood
its affirmance effectively to restrain the President. There is
not the slightest hint in any of the Youngstown opinions that
the case would have been viewed differently if President
Truman rather than Secretary Sawyer had been the named
party. If Youngstown still stands, it must stand for the case
where the President has himself taken possession and control
of the property unconstitutionally seized, and the injunction
would be framed accordingly. The practice of judicial review
would be rendered capricious-and very likely impotent-if
jurisdiction vanished whenever the President personally de-
noted an Executive action or omission as his own.19
And the Supreme Court put its imprimatur on this new princi-
ple in the case of United States v. Nixon."
After the Watergate litigation, which gave Youngstown standing
as a useful precedent in controlling presidential actions with re-
gard to domestic issues, it remained to be seen whether the case
would prove similarly effective in the field of foreign affairs. The
prevailing model of executive power before Youngstown was taken
from United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.2 in which Jus-
tice George Sutherland distinguished between the president's au-
thority in the domestic and foreign relations realms, asserting
18. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Issued to Richard M. Nixon, 360 F. Supp.
1, 8 (1973).
19. 487 F. 2d 700, 709 (1973).
20. 418 U.S. 683 (1974). Because Nixon v. Sirica had never been appealed to the Su-
preme Court, it was not until the decision in United States v. Nixon, a case dealing with
different tapes from Nixon v. Sirica, that the Court endorsed judicial review of presidential
action directly.
21. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
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that in the latter area presidential power suffered none of the
limitations imposed by the theory of enumerated powers that ap-
plied to the former. He believed that in the field of foreign affairs
the president had broad discretion to operate without constitu-
tional restrictions. The Youngstown decision, however, by invali-
dating the president's seizure of the steel mills at a time of mili-
tary conflict, provided a different analysis that appeared to cir-
cumscribe severely the executive's inherent authority to take ac-
tion in a time of international crisis. Since 1952, the two rulings
have played a critical role in the debate over presidential power
and foreign policy, essentially competing with each other to be-
come the Supreme Court's precedent of choice in cases implicating
the executive's power in foreign affairs.2
The relevance of this debate to the situation in which we find
ourselves in the first decade of the twenty-first century is obvious.
President George W. Bush has proclaimed a war on terrorism. To
respond to this, his administration has promulgated policies that
encroach on fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution to
American citizens. As Anthony Lewis asked in a recent piece on
the op-ed page of the New York Times, will the Supreme Court
"subject those measures to real constitutional scrutiny, or give
way to arguments of war emergency? '" 2' Lewis pointed to "the ar-
rest and indefinite detention of Americans without trial and with-
out access to a lawyer" as one of the administration's more fright-
ening measures, naming the cases of Yasser Hamdi and Jose
Padilla, who are being held in solitary confinement, as examples of
such a deprivation of liberty. President Bush "has claimed the
power to thus seize and hold any American whom he designates
an 'enemy combatant.' And the basis of the designation, admini-
stration lawyers argue, is not subject to effective review in any
court," Lewis wrote.24 As I read, I began to think that this
sounded eerily familiar to me, and I picked up my book on the
Steel Seizure case to find the reference of which I had been re-
minded. And there it was: the colloquy between Judge David Pine
and Holmes Baldridge, the attorney representing President Tru-
man in the oral argument in the district court.
22. For further discussion of this point, see Louis Fisher's Foreword to Marcus, Tru-
man and the Steel Seizure Case ix-xviii (reprint ed., Durham, N.C.: 1994). There are also
references to this debate in several articles contained in "Youngstown at Fifty: A Sympo-
sium," 19 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY (Spring 2002).




Defending Truman's seizure order, Baldridge lost no time in re-
vealing his thoughts on the president's authority: "our position is
that there is no power in the Courts to restrain the President and.
. . Secretary Sawyer is the alter ego of the President and not sub-
ject to injunctive order of the Court." If the president ordered Sec-
retary Sawyer to put you in jail this minute and have you exe-
cuted tomorrow, Pine queried the government lawyer, what would
happen to you? Baldridge could think of no answer, so the judge
provided one himself: "On the question of the deprivation of your
rights you have the Fifth Amendment; that is what protects you.
25
But Pine's response appeared not to make much of an impression
on Baldridge, who proceeded to argue that while the powers of
Congress and the judiciary were enumerated in the Constitution,
the President's powers were unlimited."6 Newspapers trumpeted
Baldridge's statements across the nation, and the groundswell of
public opinion against such a dictatorial conception of the presi-
dency undoubtedly encouraged Judge Pine, and later the Supreme
Court, to strike down the seizure of the steel mills.27 In this in-
stance, the Truman Administration's claims of the grave emer-
gency that would occur with any interruption in the flow of steel to
Korea did not sway the courts. As Justice Robert H. Jackson
stated in his opinion, "no doctrine that the Court could promulgate
would seem to me more sinister and alarming than that a Presi-
dent whose conduct of foreign affairs is so largely uncontrolled,
and often even is unknown, can vastly enlarge his mastery over
the internal affairs of the country by his own commitment of the
Nation's armed forces to some foreign venture.
2'8
Jackson's opinion has been profoundly influential-he alone
among the justices provided a thoughtful and realistic analysis of
the fluctuating basis of executive power that members of the Su-
preme Court have found useful in a variety of cases. But it is only
one man's opinion. In the circumstances of the war on terrorism,
will the Supreme Court find Jackson's point of view persuasive?
29
Or will the Court revert to its stance in Korematsu v. United
25. U.S. House, The Steel Seizure Case, H. Doc. 534, 82d Cong., 2d sess., 1952, p. 363.
26. Id. at 377. Truman repudiated Baldridge's view of executive power as soon as it
was made known to him.
27. 103 F. Supp. 569 (1952); 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
28. 343 U.S. 579, 642-43.
29. Or will the Court, as it did in Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981), simply




States, where it approved, as a proper exercise of the war powers,
the internment of Japanese-Americans living on the West Coast?"
Will it draw upon the distinction between actions taken on the
battlefield and those taken at home? President Truman pointed to
the problem the Court faces, as Professor Gormley observed dur-
ing the panel session. Truman wrote: "It is not really realistic for
the Justices of the Supreme Court to say that comprehensive
power shall be available to the President only when a war has
been declared, or the country has been invaded. There are no
longer sharp distinctions between military targets and the sanc-
tuary of civilian areas, nor can we separate the economic facts
from the problems of defense and security.
3'
Thus we return to where we started: what is the precedential
value of Youngstown? Because of the great number of opinions
written in that case-the opinion for the Court, five concurring
opinions, and a dissent-it is safe to say only that it established
the invalidity of the president's seizure of the steel mills in the
specific context in which it took place. Beyond that, the Court left
the president much room to maneuver. A lawyer in the Depart-
ment of Justice Office of Legal Counsel once told me that Youngs-
town rarely affects the advice the office gives the president on the
legality of contemplated actions. They know the decision exists,
but it is not dispositive. 32 The president can take his chances be-
fore the Court, because the outcome of any given case depends so
much on the way the Court classifies the executive action: will the
justices analyze the contested action under the president's foreign
affairs power, as a matter of national security, or as an ordinary
domestic measure? Youngstown, with its multiplicity of opinions,
allows the Court great leeway in interpretation. It has been in-
voked in support of presidential power as well as having been
cited to defend striking down an executive action.
30. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). As Anthony Lewis noted in his op-ed piece, it is hardly likely
that the Supreme Court today would uphold the internment of a particular ethnic group.
But might it use the same considerations that justified that action in 1944 to validate some
of the Bush Administration measures responding to the war on terrorism? Possibly.
31. See PRESIDENT TRUMAN AND THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE: TRANSCRIPT OF
PROCEEDINGS, supra at 714.
32. Telephone interview with Leon Ulman, deputy assistant attorney general in the
Office of Legal Counsel, October 16, 1974.
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Will Youngstown, in this era of terrorism, become a forceful and
frequently used precedent to rein in executive encroachments on
civil rights and civil liberties or will it be ignored? Will we see a
reaffirmation of the principle that the president-and his attorney
general-are not above the law? The Court is still out.

